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Abstract
In all areas of human activity, there are natural ordering relations:
causality in space-time physics, preference in decision making, and logical inference in reasoning. In space-time physics, a 1950 theorem by
A. D. Alexandrov proved that causality relation is fundamental: many
other features, including numerical characteristics of time and space, can
be reconstructed from this relation. In this paper, we provide simple
proofs that, similarly, the corresponding ordering relations are fundamental in decision making and in logical reasoning.

1

Order Relations Are Important

Main objectives of science and engineering. One of the main objectives
of science and engineering is to help people select the most beneficial decisions.
To make these decisions,
• we must know people’s preferences,
• we must have the information about different events – possible consequences of different decisions, and
• we must be able to use this information to come up with decisions.
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Enter order relations. In each of these three categories, we have natural
order relations:
• for preferences, a ≤ b means that b is preferable to a;
• for events, a ≤ b means that a can influence b; this relation is known as
causality; and
• in reasoning, a ≤ b means that we can infer b from a; this relation is known
as implication and is usually denoted by a → b.
Important comment: these relations are often not binary. Sometimes,
we are absolutely sure that an alternative b is better than an alternative a, that
an event a can influence an event b, that a statement a definitely implies the
statement b. In such cases, the corresponding relation is “binary” in the sense
that:
• for some pairs (a, b), the relation a ≤ b is absolutely true, while
• for some other pairs (a, b), the relation a ≤ b is absolutely not true.
However, in many cases, we are not 100% certain:
• we believe that the alternative b is most probably better, but we have
some doubts; as a result, people sometimes select a;
• we believe that b can probably be inferred from a, but we are not absolutely
sure; for example, in a trial by jury, there is often a reasonable doubt, and,
because of this, a suspect goes free in spite of some strong indirect evidence
against him.
In the following text, we will take this uncertainty into account.
What we do in this paper. It is known that the causality relation is fundamental in space-time physics, in the sense that many other properties are
uniquely determined by this relation. This fact was first proved by A. D. Alexandrov in 1950.
In this paper, we provide simple proofs that ordering relations are – in this
sense – fundamental in decision making and logical reasoning as well.
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Alexandrov-Zeeman Theorem: Reminder

Causality in physics: a brief reminder. To describe the AlexandrovZeeman theorem, let us first briefly recall how causality is defined in physics;
see, e.g., [10, 44].
In Newton’s physics, signals can potentially travel with an arbitrarily large
speed. To describe the corresponding causality relation between events, let us
denote an event occurring at the spatial location x at time t by a = (t, x). In
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these notations, Newton’s causality relation is as follows: an event a = (t, x)
can causally (physically) influence an event a0 = (t0 , x0 ) if and only if t ≤ t0 :
(t, x) ≤ (t0 , x0 ) ⇔ t ≤ t0 .

(1)

In Special Relativity, the speed of all the signals is limited by the speed of
light c. As a result, a = (t, x) ≤ a0 = (t0 , x0 ) if and only if t0 ≥ t and in time
t0 − t, the speed needed to traverse the distance d(x, x0 ) does not exceed c, i.e.,
d(x, x0 )
≤ c. The resulting causality relation has the form
t0 − t
(t, x) ≤ (t0 , x0 ) ⇔ c · (t0 − t) ≥ d(x, x0 ).

(2)

Alexandrov-Zeeman theorem. In 1950, A. D. Alexandrov showed that in
Special Relativity, causality implied Lorenz group [1, 2]. To be more precise, he
proved that every transformation of the 4-dimensional space-time that preserves
the causality relation (2) is linear, and is a composition of:
• shifts in space and time,
• spatial rotations,
• Lorentz transformations (describing a transition to a moving reference
frame), and
• re-scalings x → λ · x (corresponding to a change of unit for measuring
space and time).
This theorem was later generalized by E. Zeeman [47] and is therefore known
as the Alexandrov-Zeeman theorem; see, e.g., [3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 36, 42, 47].
This theorem showed that causality indeed plays a fundamental role in spacetime physics: once we know this relation, we can reconstruct the linear structure
of space-time, we can reconstruct (modulo a possible multiplicative constant)
the values of proper time and proper space, etc.
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Order Relation in Decision Making

How preferences are described in decision theory: a brief reminder.
We want to prove that the notion of preference is as fundamental in decision
making as causality is in space-time physics. For this purpose, let us recall how
preferences are described in decision theory; see, e.g., [11, 12, 22, 31, 37, 38, 43].
The usual way to provide a numerical description of preferences is to select
two alternatives:
• a very bad alternative A− which is worse than anything we will actually
encounter, and
3

• a very good alternative A+ which is better than anything we will actually
encounter.
Then, to provide a numerical value to any actual alternative A, we ask the
person to compare this alternative with lotteries in which this person:
• gets A+ with some probability p and
• gets A− with the remaining probability 1 − p,
for different values p. We will denote such a lottery by L(p).
• When the probability p is small, the lottery is almost the same as the
very bad alternative A− . So, due to our choice of A− , the alternative A
is better than L(p): L(p) ≤ A.
• When the probability p is close to 1, the lottery is almost the same as the
very good alternative A+ . So, due to our choice of A+ , the alternative A
is worse than L(p): A ≤ L(p).
As we increase the probability p of the very good outcome A+ , the lottery
becomes more and more preferable. So, at some probability p0 , the decision
maker switches from L(p) < A to A < L(p). This threshold value p0 is known
as the utility of the alternative A. The utility is usually denoted by u(A).
Utility is not uniquely determined. The numerical value of the utility
depends on our choice of the alternatives A− and A+ . One can show that if we
select a different pair A0− , A0+ , then the corresponding numerical value u0 (A) is
related to the original value u(A) by a linear dependence
u0 (A) = a · u(A) + b,

(3)

for some values a > 0 and b (which do not depend on the alternative A).
How people actually make decisions. In the ideal world, if a person encounters n alternatives with utilities u1 , . . . , un , this person should select the
alternative with the largest utility – because, by definition of utility, this alternative is equivalent to the lottery in which the probability of winning the big
prize A+ is the highest. In reality, the person may select other alternatives as
well. The probability of selecting the i-th is equal to:
exp(α · ui )
pi = P
,
n
exp(α · uj )

(4)

j=1

for some value α > 0 depending on the person. This formula is known as the discrete choice model; see, e.g., [30, 32, 33, 34, 45]. For this formula, D. McFadden
received a Nobel Prize.
The formula (4) confirms what we have mentioned earlier: that human preference is not a binary relation, it is characterized by the probabilities pi of
selecting different alternatives.
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Comment. As shown in [9], the formula (4) is not just empirically valid: it can
be explained by natural symmetry ideas.
Main result of this section. The following result shows that the preference
relation – as described by the probabilities pi – determines utilities uniquely
– modulo the linear transformation (3). Thus, for decision making, the corresponding ordering relation is indeed also fundamental.
Proposition 1. If for two sequences u1 , . . . , un and u01 , . . . , u0n and for some
values α > 0 and α0 > 0, we have pi = p0i for all i, where
exp(α0 · u0i )
exp(α · ui )
def
0
,
and
p
=
pi = P
i
n
n
P
exp(α · uj )
exp(α0 · u0j )
j=1

(5)

j=1

then there exists values a > 0 and b for which
u0i = a · ui + b

(6)

for all i.
Proof. For each i 6= 1, if we divide the equality pi = p0i by the equality p1 = p01 ,
we get
pi
p0
(8)
= 0i .
p1
p1
Substituting the expressions (6) instead of pi , p1 , p0i , and p01 , we conclude that
exp(α · ui )
exp(α0 · u0i )
=
,
exp(α · u1 )
exp(α0 · u01 )

(9)

exp(α · (ui − u1 )) = exp(α0 · (u0i − u01 )).

(10)

i.e., equivalently,

By taking logarithm of both sides and dividing both sides by α0 , we conclude
that
u0i − u01 = a · (ui − u1 ),
(11)
def

where we denoted a = α/α0 . Hence,
u0i = a · ui + (u01 − a · u1 ),
def

(12)

i.e., the desired formula (6) for b = u01 − a · u1 .
We are almost done: we have proved the formula (6) for all i 6= 1. However,
one can easily show that for i = 1, the right-hand side of the formula (12) is
also equal to its left-hand side u01 . So, the proposition is proven.
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Order Relation in Logical Reasoning

How can we describe degree of inference in logical reasoning: a brief
reminder. A direction of logic that describes degrees of certainty – i.e., that
analyzes statements which are imprecise (“fuzzy”) is known as fuzzy logic; see,
e.g., [6, 19, 35, 40, 41, 46].
The original – and simplest – idea is to take into account that in a computer:
• “false” is represented as 0, and
• “true” is represented as 1.
Thus, it is reasonable to describe intermediate degrees by numbers from the
interval (0, 1).
There are many different implication operations, i.e., functions f→ (a, b) that
transform the expert’s degree of confidence a and b in some statements A and
B into the estimated degree of confidence in the implication A → B. Such
peration should satisfy several reasonable properties. For example:
• If we accept a statement A in which we are not 100% sure, then we can
get conclusions that we could not get before. In this case, the statement
A → B can have larger degree of confidence than the statement B itself.
• However, if, as A, we take an absolutely true statement T , with degree
a = 1, then adding this statement will not change what we can conclude.
Thus, our degree of confidence f→ (1, b) in the implication T → B should
be exactly the same as our degree of confidence b in the original statement
B: f→ (1, b) = b.
The values f→ (a, b) corresponding to different a and b represent the inference
ordering.
Main result of this section. The following result shows that the inference
relation – as described by the degrees f& (a, b) – uniquely determines the original
degrees a and b.
Thus, for logical reasoning, the corresponding ordering relation is indeed also
fundamental.
Definition 1. By an implication operation, we mean a function
f→ : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1]

(13)

for which f→ (1, b) = b for all b.
Proposition 2. Suppose that we have two sequences a1 , . . . , an and a01 , . . . , a0n
such that for some i0 , we have ai0 = bi0 = 1. Suppose also that we have two
0
implication operations f→ and f→
for which, for all i and j, we have
0
f→ (ai , aj ) = f→
(a0i , a0j ).

Then, for all j, we have aj = a0j .
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(14)

Proof. For each j from 1 to n, substituting i = i0 into the formula (14) and
0
(1, a0j ).
taking into account that ai0 = a0i0 = 1, we conclude that f→ (1, aj ) = f→
Now, by definition of an implication operation, we conclude that indeed aj = a0j .
The proposition is proven.
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